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Ascholar and senior reporter with the Xinhua NewsAgency, Yang Jisheng garnered considerable inter-est in China and overseas when he published his
book Tombstone: A Record of the Great Famine in China
in the 1960s in Hong Kong in 2008. Although a number of
books on the famine have been published in China and the
West, Yang’s book is notable for the comprehensiveness and
accuracy of the information presented, the startling and pre-
viously unknown inside information he provides, his detailed
and closely reasoned evidence, and the authority and credi-
bility of his conclusions.
I feel this is a monumental work comparable to
Solzhenitsyn’s Nobel Prize-winning work The Gulag
Archipelago. Although Chinese authors have exposed the
truth behind the Chinese gulag to a large extent, if we say
that Russia’s Gulag symbolised the Stalinist era, the death
of tens of millions of people in China’s Great Famine must
be considered similarly emblematic of the Mao Zedong era.
I have previously lamented that the victims and survivors of
China’s repeated political movements have not benefited
from a single-minded devotion to restoring history on the
same scale as Solzhenitsyn’s obsessively and tenaciously
compiled record of evil. Tombstone embodies a conscience,
sense of national responsibility, and historical insight similar
to Solzhenitsyn’s, and in its compilation and analysis of his-
torical records and disclosure of inside information, it actual-
ly surpasses The Gulag Archipelago. Of course it can be
said that Yang Jisheng’s identity and circumstances were
more conducive to the project than Solzhenitsyn’s, but as a
rule, advantages of position and circumstances can actually
bring their own baggage and con-
cerns. There have been others like
Yang Jisheng who as insiders to the
system have placed themselves at
great personal risk for the sake of jus-
tice — Gu Zhun and Li Shenzhi (1)
come to mind — but they have been
few and far between.
Part of the motivation behind
Tombstone is deeply personal. The
author’s father, a good and upright
ordinary peasant, starved to death
during the famine in 1959, and half a
century later, his father’s miserable
last days and the unbearable condi-
tions in his home village remain stark
before the author’s eyes. In his pref-
ace, the author says that the book is
his means of erecting a tombstone for
his father and for the other 36 million
victims of the famine.A n a uthe nticp a nora m ic a ccounto f  the  fa m ine
Starting in the 1990s, the author used
his position and opportunity to travel
around the country as a Xinhua
reporter to gain access to relevant doc-
uments and interview people who had experienced the
famine. With the help of colleagues and friends, he was able
to talk with former officials who were familiar with the situa-
tion, and also to read highly confidential files and documents.
All of this helps make Tombstone a comprehensive and
authentic record of the famine.
Erecting a Tombstone for 
36 Million Famine Victims
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1. Gu Zhun (1915-1974) was a liberal intellectual who spent much of his later years in
prison as a victim of anti-Rightist purges. Li Shenzhi (1923-2003) was vice-president of
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and a noted proponent of liberalism. (All foot-
notes are Translator’s Notes)
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Starting in the 1990s, the author of Tombstone, 
Yang Jisheng, began using his position as a Xinhua
reporter to gather information on the Great Famine
[of 1959-1961]. The resulting massive compendium
of data and inside information provides details on
the severity of the famine and its causes in each
province, and powerfully refutes official
prevarication over the disaster. (Kaifang)
Yang Jisheng,
Mubei.
Zhongguo liushi
niandai da
jihuang jishi
(Tombstone: A
Record of the
Great Famine in
China in the
1960s),
Hong Kong, Cosmos
Books, 2008, 2 vol.,
1096 pp. 
Erecting a Tombstone for 36 Million Famine Victims
When China’s Great Famine is mentioned, the first place
that comes to mind is Henan Province, especially the
Xinyang area. Focusing on Xinyang, Tombstone provides
detailed records that drill down to the county and village
level, as well as examining the situation at the provincial
level, in the Central South Bureau, and in the central gov-
ernment. After comparing and analysing the various data
and methods, the author concludes that at least 3 million
people starved to death in Henan Province, with 1 million
dying in the Xinyang area alone, more than one out of every
eight inhabitants.
The population of Gansu Province totalled only 13 million,
but more than 1 million died of starvation throughout the
province. The greatest proportion of deaths occurred in
Tongwei County, where one out of every three inhabitants
died and 70 percent of all families experienced at least one
death, with some families completely wiped out. A cadre
who was dispatched to sort out the “Tongwei problem” at
the time recalls seeing the dead and the living lying togeth-
er on beds, along the roadways, and in the fields, the living
lacking the strength or will to bury the dead; in any case, it
was the living they feared, not the dead, because the living
might well eat them.
Sichuan had throughout China’s history enjoyed the reputa-
tion of “Heaven’s pantry,” thanks to its fertile soil and abun-
dant crops, but it suffered the most deaths of any other
province during the famine, a total of some 10 to 12 million.
The difficulty in ascertaining the exact number is due to the
fact that at that time the Sichuan Provincial Party
Committee had political control over population statistics,
and ordered that the areas reporting the highest number of
deaths “carry out a new survey.” Sichuan suffered from the
famine for the longest period of time. Its top leader, Li
Jingquan, (2) was adept at anticipating Mao Zedong’s wishes.
He did not flinch from proceeding with the ultra-leftist Great
Leap Forward, and sent out vast quantities of the province’s
produce as a testimony to the correctness of official policy
and the favourability of the province’s circumstances. He
paved his eventual promotion to the Politburo with 10 mil-
lion lives.
Anhui’s Fengyang County became renowned for the num-
ber of its inhabitants that fled in search of food. Out of the
county’s original 400,000 residents, some 90,000 starved to
death during the three years of famine, nearly one out of
every four. The main cause of the famine was high produc-
tion targets and yield estimates coupled with high rates of
procurement. Fengyang’s production target in 1958 was 400
million kilos of grain, (3) but the actual harvest was only 80
million kilos. The state forcibly requisitioned 43 percent of
the harvest, leaving the farmers who had produced it with-
out enough grain to meet their own needs. In 1959, the
county produced 90 million kilos, compared with its target of
200 million. An estimated 5 to 6 million people starved to
death in Anhui Province, more than 15 percent of the total
population. In Hao County there were recurrent incidents of
cannibalism, and even reports of human flesh being sold
from stalls and carts that circulated from village to village.
Many of the incidents that occurred during the famine years
seem fantastic when viewed from today’s perspective, and
would seem laughable if they were not so tragic. In the
spring of 1960, villages in the Dingxi region of Gansu
Province ran out of food, but the local Party secretary said,
“It’s better for people to starve to death than for us to ask
the state for food supplies.” In the process of forcibly requi-
sitioning foodstuffs, Tongwei County sent the following
directive to the People’s Communes: “If you cannot fulfil the
food requisitioning assignment, bring your heads on a plat-
ter!” The slogan at the time was, “Better to owe a blood
debt than a food debt. Fulfilling the grain assignment is a
fight to the death.” In the winter of 1960, the Party commit-
tee of Hebei Province decided that each villager should be
allocated a grain ration of four liang a day (the equivalent of
about 125 grams in today’s measurement). The head of the
Party committee said that eating four liang was Marxist, and
eating more than that was anti-Marxist. Subsequently the
committee put forward the slogan, “Eat four liang and bask
in the sun.” Tombstone‘s author notes that a person cannot
perform photosynthesis, so how could sunbathing make up
for lack of sustenance?T ot al  s tar v ati on toll  a nd thec aus es  of  the  fa mi ne
How many people actually died in the course of the Great
Famine? This is a question that has raised strong debate and
a variety of opinions.
Before Tombstone‘s publication, researchers in China and
abroad had compiled various data and materials in an
attempt to calculate how many people had died, with most
estimates ranging from 20 to 40 million. Old guard and neo-
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2. Li Jingquan (1908-1989), a key figure in China’s southwest region in the 1950s and
1960s, was attacked during the Cultural Revolution as a “governor of his own kingdom”
and relieved of all his positions, but he was rehabilitated in 1973, serving on the CCP
Central Committee and the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress until
a few years before his death.
3. Literally, 800 million jin, a Chinese measure of volume equivalent to about half a kilo-
gram. Subsequent measures have been similarly converted.
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leftists wracked their brains to undermine these estimates,
arguing without the backing of evidence that they had been
purposely exaggerated in order to slander the reputations of
Mao Zedong, the Great Leap Forward, and the People’s
Communes. Their quibbles assumed a cruel logic under
which starvation deaths below a certain number should be
considered normal and acceptable and proof that Mao had
not been wrong. In fact, taking a mere 10 percent of the low-
est estimate, we can go back to these leftists and ask what
justification there might be for even two million people to
have starved to death.
Yang Jisheng’s conclusion after comparing and analysing var-
ious methods and figures is that the number of people
throughout China who died unnatural deaths during the
Great Famine totalled 36 million, with an estimated addition-
al 40 million who were never born as a result of the famine,
making a total loss to China’s population of 70 million lives.
I believe this is a relatively scientific and reliable figure.
What caused this nationwide famine, and why did it kill so many
people? From Tombstone we learn of the following causes.
Because of the exaggerations of the Great Leap Forward, all
provinces and localities raised their production targets, yield
estimates, and procurement levels. China’s total grain output
was stated as 375 billion kilos in 1958, but the subsequent-
ly recorded figure (itself quite possibly an exaggeration) was
200 billion kilos. The actual production output was about
the same as the year before, but government procurement
increased by 20 percent, with the result that food was virtu-
ally snatched from the mouths of the peasants.
In order to meet the high procurement quotas, peasants were
forced to throw in their grain rations, livestock feed, and
seeds, and if the procurement quota still wasn’t met, the high-
er level authorities accused the peasants of falsely reporting
output and holding back a portion for themselves (manchan
sifen). It was standard practice throughout the country to use
methods such as dismissing grassroots cadres, holding public
criticism sessions, beatings, re-education through labour, and
detention to force households to surrender grain, and count-
less local cadres and peasants were harshly beaten, some of
them to death. Public criticism sessions employed the follow-
ing catechism: “Has the production team made a Great Leap
Forward?” “We have leaped forward.” “Are the People’s
Communes outstanding?” “They’re outstanding.” “So why
don’t you hand over your grain?”
Other slogans included, “Hiding grain is like concealing a
bomb.” The famous scientist Qian Xuesen (4) published an
article confirming that crop yields could attain 19,500 kilos
per mu (5) of land, providing “scientific proof” for the cam-
paign against “false reporting of output and holding back for
personal use.“
The communal kitchens that Mao Zedong so loved and pro-
moted were a major cause of starvation among the peasants.
Based on his analysis of the data, the author holds that with-
out communal kitchens, the number of deaths might have
been reduced by a third and in some places by half.
Promotion of the communal kitchens resulted in free meals for
the first two months, during which people ate and drank to
their hearts’ content, followed by a battle with famine when
food ran out. That involved forcing peasants to contribute to
the program, combining all food resources, confiscating cook-
ing utensils, detaining householders who built their own
hearth fires, and stripping peasant homes to their timbers.
The greatest damage caused by the communal kitchens was
“imposing the dictatorship of the proletariat on each individ-
ual’s stomach.” Cadres exerted full power over who was
allowed or not allowed to eat, while assuming a position in
which they had the privilege of eating all they wanted. 
The abuse of power by officials and cadres exacerbated the
distress of already desperate peasants. Militia were dis-
patched to surround, pursue, intercept, cut off, and detain
peasants to prevent them from seeking refuge elsewhere,
depriving famine victims of their last chance for survival.De nounci ng  the  s ophi str y  andlie s  of  Pa rt y o f fi c ia ls
Facing this monumental tragedy, the Party leadership fabri-
cated sources of blame such as a “three-year natural disas-
ter” and “indebtedness to the Soviet revisionists,” platitudes
that continued to trip off the tongues of the Chinese people
for many years. Tombstone includes a detailed examination
and powerful refutation of these allegations.
The author cites authoritative climatic data and the views of
authoritative climate experts to show that weather and cli-
mate conditions were unexceptional in the years 1959-1961.
That is to say, given the vastness of China’s land mass, it
would be difficult to avoid some form of natural calamity in
the course of a year, but those occurring in the three years
of the famine were no more severe than in other years. The
author goes a step further to point out that historical data
show little direct relationship between crop yield and natural
disasters; the 11 years of 1956, 1957, 1962, 1963, and 1977-
1983 all experienced natural disasters on a wider scale than
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4. Born in 1911, Qian received PhDs from MIT and the California Institute of Technology
before returning to China and gaining renown as the “Father of Chinese Aerospace.”
5. Approximately 0.66 square kilometres.
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Erecting a Tombstone for 36 Million Famine Victims
in 1959, but no famine resulted, and in 9 of those years,
crop yield actually exceeded that of the year before.
The accusation against the USSR was that the Soviets tore
up agreements, withdrew expert advisors and began pressing
China for repayment of debts. Tombstone points out that the
USSR’s cancelling of agreements and withdrawal of expert
advisors occurred in the second half of 1960, when the Great
Famine had already been in progress for more than a year,
and in any case, the expert advice and science and technolo-
gy agreements were not related to agriculture or crop yield. As
far as the repayment of debt is concerned, the author could
not find a single document or piece of data to back up the alle-
gation. On the contrary, in March 1961 the Soviet Union sug-
gested that in order to help China deal with the famine, it was
willing to loan China one million tons of wheat and 500,000
tons of cane sugar. China, however, refused the wheat and
only accepted the sugar. China paid off its debt to the Soviet
Union before it came due, but this was not because of pres-
sure from the USSR, but rather Mao Zedong taking the ini-
tiative to “vindicate” himself in the eyes of Soviet leaders.
The book quotes China’s Foreign Trade Minister as saying
in 1961, “Because of the severe natural disaster suffered by
China over the last two years, there was a very large short-
fall in the commodities provided to the Soviet Union in
1960. In 1961 there were many products that could not be
exported or could only be exported in smaller quantities,
which caused definite hardship for the Soviet Union.
However, our Soviet comrades expressed a comradely coop-
eration and fraternal understanding regarding this situation.
The Soviet government agreed to let us repay our trade debt
in instalments over the next five years without interest. They
also offered to loan China 500,000 tons of cane sugar on an
interest-free basis, which China could subsequently repay in
the same quantity. We feel this is a great help and support
to us in surmounting our temporary difficulties.” (6)
During the famine years, the Chinese government provided
enormous funding and material aid to certain countries,
some of which already enjoyed a much higher standard of
living than China. While China’s peasants were dropping
like flies from starvation, the government continued to export
large quantities of foodstuffs. China experienced reduced
food output in 1959 compared with 1957, but its food
exports doubled to a record high. That amount of food
would have been enough to feed 24.5 million people for an
entire year.
In 1960, while vast numbers of peasants were starving to
death, the authorities would not consider opening the grain
stores, but rather added to their stock. In a year when death
by starvation reached a peak, the state held tens of billions
of kilos of grain in storage.
The leftists defend the government by saying that the famine
was caused by the reckless actions of lower-level cadres, and
that the central government and Mao himself knew nothing of
the true circumstances. On this point the book makes its most
important disclosure: In 1961, the heads of the Food Ministry
and the State Bureau of Statistics were ordered to fill out a
form detailing food supplies and population for each province
of China. Their figures showed that the country’s population
had been reduced by tens of millions. This data was provided
exclusively to Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong, and after review-
ing it, Zhou ordered that it be immediately destroyed and not
shown to anyone else. Subsequently Zhou chased up the mat-
ter to ascertain that the data had in fact been destroyed, and
was only able to relax upon being reassured on that point.
When Mao Zedong was informed of the severity of the sit-
uation in Xinyang, he attributed the matter to class enemies
usurping leadership, a restoration to power of the counter-
revolutionaries, and a frenzied class retaliation inflicted upon
the working people. He resolved this by carrying out supple-
mentary training in democratic revolution, which brought
about wide-scale infighting, dismissals, and detentions
among grass-roots cadres.
Another excuse advanced by some is that Mao Zedong suf-
fered along with the rest of the Chinese people during the
three years of hardship, and ate no meat. The book refutes
this by citing official publications, including the menu for a
Western-style meal for Mao that included fish and prawns
prepared in 17 different styles. An inside source also reveals
that a doctor warned Mao of an elevated cholesterol count
caused by excessive pork consumption, and advised him to
switch to mutton. During that period, villas and guest hous-
es were being constructed and refurbished throughout China
to house Mao to a standard of luxury exceeding that of state
guest houses.
Tombstone analyses the systemic factors involved in the Great
Famine, with the author throughout the book describing this
system as “totalitarianism.” This shows that the author’s under-
standing is on a par with the importance of the subject.•
• This article was published in the October 2008 edition of
Hong Kong’s Open Magazine (Kaifang).
• Translated by Stacy Mosher
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6. See “The Expensive Mr. Mao,” contemporary media analyses on the 1961 USSR-China
trade protocol, posted on the Open Society Archives, http://www.osaarchivum.org/
files/holdings/300/8/3/text/90-4-183.shtml.
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